

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
OROVILLE DAM SAFETY
COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Further Description and Clarification of the Comprehensive Needs Assessment Project

Meeting No. 2 – Oroville Dam Safety Ad Hoc Committee October 30, 2018



Commitment to CNA

From the June 27, 2017 memorandum to DSOD, and the June 28, 2017 letter from DWR to FERC:

tate of California

Memorandum

To: Sharon Tapia, Chief

Division of Operations and N Pepartment of Water Resources

Subject: Comprehensive Needs As

Over the past decade, a numb Maintenance (O&M) have fox appurtenances and other dam ongoing integrity of troville D. DVR has performed a number of the outest (drawdown) caped by the country of the outest (drawdown) caped by the outest (drawdown) caped the anticipated new Licerae). The anticipated new Licerae, I negage these various efforts a Assessment to identify and privated inside enhanced licerae.

As key internal and consultant become available, O&M plans priorities and appropriate solut Some solutions might also pro redundancy, improve compilar possible power generation op; Safety of Dams' participation it and to discuss priorities and provide DSCD with a detailed 31, 2017.

If you have any questions, pleat contact David Panec, Chief of Safety Branch, at (916) 653-07

J. Ledesma D. Samson D. Panec

SURNAME POR 151 (Spr 7/11)

Cattlernia Netural Resources Agent

June 28, 2017

Mr. Frank L. Blackett, P.E. Regional Engineer Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 100 First Street, Suite 2300 San Francisco, California 94105-3084

FERC Project No. 2100 - Oroville Dam - Comprehensis

Dear Mr. Blacket

Over the past decade, a number of efforts within the De, (DWR) have focused on improving the reliability of exist dam safety measures that contribute to the safety and o and those appurtnant structures. Specifically, DWR ha studies to explore safe means of increasing the low leve and access to cold water within the reservoir pool. The Species Act mandate under DWR's Federal Energy Reg Project No. 2100 hydropower license and these obligatic increase under the anticipated new license. DWR plans efforts and formally initiate a Comprehensive Needs Ass prioritize dam safety enhancements for the future which instrumentation if deemed a necessary improvement.

As key internal and consultant resources from the spillw become available. DVMP plants to pursue this assessmer priorities and appropriate solutions to enhance dam safe Some solutions might also provide secondary benefits a improving compliance with downstream flow and tempel generation opportunities. DVM respectfully requests FE to assess the needs of the Orvolle complex and to discs solutions with respect to dam safety. DVMR will provide 1 scope, and schedule for this effort by December 31, 201

Mr. Frank L. Blackett, P.E. June 28, 2017 Page 2

If you have any questions or would like to discuss this further, please contact me at (916) 557-4554 or your staff may contact David Panec, State Water Project's Chief Darn Safety Engineer at (916) 653-0772

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Gwen Scholl, Acting Chief Hydropower License Planning and Compliance Office Executive Division

cc: Ms. Sharon Tapia, Chief Division of Safety of Dams 2200 X Street, Suite 200 Sacramento, California 95818

bcc: M. Andersen, 1115-9

D. Duval, 605-1 T. Craddock, 1623 B. Soltanzadeh, 649-

B. Soltanzadeh, 649-J. Ledesma, JOC D. Samson, 631-4

D. Panec, 631-1 D. Sarkisian, 631-6

J. Leahigh, JOC T. Zasso, JOC

T. Zasso, JOC P. Whitlock, OFD

M. Hafner, OFD J. Kuttel, DOE

J. Zumot, DOE

"Over the past decade, a number of efforts within the Department of Water Resources (DWR) have focused on improving the reliability of exiting appurtenances and other dam safety measures that contribute to the safety and ongoing integrity of Oroville Dam and those appurtenant structures."

"As key internal and consultant resources from the Spillway Recovery Design Phase become available, DWR plans to reengage these various efforts and formally initiate a Comprehensive Needs Assessment to identify and prioritize dam safety enhancements for the future, which would include enhanced instrumentation if deemed a necessary improvement."



Definition of CNA

"...to identify measures to restore and improve, as necessary, the safety and reliability of Oroville Dam and the appurtenant structures."

STATE OF CALIFORNIA - CALIFORNIA NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

EDMUND G. BROWN JR., Governor

DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES

1416 NINTH STREET, P.O. BOX 942836 SACRAMENTO, CA 94236-0001 (916) 653-5791



January 12, 2018

Mr. Frank L. Blackett, P.E. Regional Engineer Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 100 First Street, Suite 2300 San Francisco, California 94105-3084

FERC Project No. 2100 – Oroville Dam, Dam Safety Comprehensive Needs Assessment Plan and Schedule

Dear Mr. Blackett:

By letter dated June 28, 2017, the Department of Water Resources (DWR) informed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) of its intent to initiate a Comprehensive Needs Assessment (project) to identify measures to bolster the safety and reliability of Oroville Dam and the appurtenant structures. Over the past several months, DWR has identified the following six project tasks:

- Task 1 Alternatives Evaluation to Restore Spillway Design Capacity to Pass the Probable Maximum Flood
- Task 2 Operations Needs Assessment to Support Development of Alternative Reservoir Outflow Enhancements
- Task 3 Flood Control Outlet Enhanced Reliability
- Task 4 Alternatives Evaluation for Low-level Outlet
- Task 5 Oroville Dam Embankment Reliability and Improvements
- Task 6 Instrumentation and Monitoring for the Oroville Dam Complex

The project is scheduled to begin January 16, 2018 and conclude by December 31, 2019. A list of prioritized dam safety and operational reliability needs will be produced through completion of the project. Those needs will then be evaluated by DWR management and scheduled as projects through normal practices and procedures. As the project progresses, the Project Manager may identify projects that provide significant public safety and risk reduction benefits. Such projects may be submitted to DWR management for early implementation. DWR will comply with FERC and other regulatory agencies' submittal, review, and approval processes as part of the implementation.



Independent Review Board Comment

"The scope of a comprehensive project to assess the needs of Oroville Dam could be interpreted in many ways without appropriate definition of scope and context."

Recommendation from the IRB

M1-22 The IRB recommends that future presentations to the public and the final project report provide a description of the rationale for the tasks included in the project.

Outlet Doutets -



Ad Hoc Committee Comment

"The use of the term "Comprehensive Needs
 Assessment" implies a more thorough examination
 of needs than currently proposed via the identified
 six (6) tasks and may be interpreted by the public
 as misleading."



DWR Response to IRB and Ad Hoc Committee Comments

"Concur"

The Ad Hoc Committee (and IRB) make a good point that others could assume a project scope that goes beyond an infrastructure evaluation.

DWR's October 23, 2018 letter and presentations at the Ad Hoc Committee (and IRB) Meeting No. 2 intended to clarify scope as an evaluation of Oroville Dam complex infrastructure.

Outlief Doutable -



Conceptualization

"Comprehensive Needs Assessment" title commonly used by DWR O&M Division for projects that thoroughly assess infrastructure conditions.

Conceptualized as a component-by-component dam safety and operational reliability evaluation similar to United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) Comprehensive Facility Review (CFR)

- Structural Facility Considerations
- Dam Safety Performance Considerations



Structural Facility Considerations

Impounding Facility (S1)

Spillway (S2)

Outlet (S3)

Instrumentation (S4)

outlet Portols -

Switchward -

Area Continu Contin



Dam Safety Performance Considerations

Stability (P1)

Spillway Safety and capacity (P2)

Outlet Discharge Capacity and Integrity (P3)

Seepage and Leakage (P4)

Surveillance and Monitoring (P5)

Outlet Portols -

Switchyard -



Dam Safety Focus Designations

	Critical Structures					
	S1	Impounding Facility				
	S2	Spillway				
	S3	Outlets				
	S4	Instrumentation				
	Perfor	ormance				
3	P1	Stability				
	P2	Spillway Safety and Capacity				
	P3	Outlet (Low-Level and High-Level)				
	P4	Seepage and Leakage				
1	P5	Surveillance and Monitoring				



Comparison of CNA to General Approach for Dam Safety Evaluations

CNA TASK	AREA of FOCUS
Task 1 – Spillway Alternatives	S1, S2, P1, P2, P4, P5
Task 2 – Operations Needs Assessment	S2, S3, P2, P3
Task 3 – FCO Enhanced Reliability	S1 – S4, P1 – P5
Task 4 – Low Level Outlet Alternatives	S1, S3, P1 – P5
Task 5 – Embankment Reliability and Improvements	S1, P1, P4, P5
Task 6 – Instrumentation and Monitoring	S4, P1 – P5



IFT Lessons Learned - Concurrence

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The IFT offers six industry-level lessons to be learned that it has identified during the investigation. These lessons apply generally to dam safety practice in the United States and are related to:


- Physical inspections (all tasks except Task 2 Operations Needs Assessment)
- Comprehensive facility reviews (all tasks)
- Regulatory compliance (all tasks)
- Potential Failure Mode Analyses (PFMAs) (all tasks)
- Consideration of appurtenant structures (all tasks)
- Owners' dam safety programs and dam safety culture (DWR Management Initiative)



Related Topics and Venues

1	General Organizational, Regulatory, and Industry Factors	DWR has provided its response to the General Organizational, Regulatory, and Industry Factors identified by the Independent Forensics Team in three separate letters to FERC. In these letters, DWR outlines immediate, near-term, and long-term initiatives to advance the SWP Dam Safety Program. This advancement will be a multi-year, continuous improvement effort, and will be captured in annual updates to the SWP Owner's Dam Safety Program documents that are filed at FERC.			
1	Water Control Manual	A formal update to the WCM is under the authority of the USACE. It is anticipated that the process for updating the WCM will take multiple years and is dependent upon the adoption of potential infrastructural changes resulting from the CNA process.			
3 8	Forecast Informed Reservoir Operations	DWR has been engaged with the USACE and Yuba County Water Agency on a Forecast Informed Operations Program and all three agencies will consider adopting some aspects of Forecast Informed Operations during the development of the WCM updates.			
" / /	Facility Security	DWR closely coordinates efforts to ensure the security of the facility with appropriate agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, the California Office of Emergency Services, the California Highway Patrol, the Butte County Sheriff, and California Department of Parks and Recreation law enforcement personnel. All security protocols meet the requirements of these agencies. As required by these agencies, details about these efforts are not made available to the public.			





STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES

OROVILLE DAM SAFETY COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Comprehensive Needs Assessment: Project Integration and Evaluation

Meeting No. 2 – Oroville Dam Safety Ad Hoc Committee October 30, 2018





Initially Identified Project Tasks

- 1. Alternatives Evaluation to Restore Spillway Design Capacity to Pass the Probable Maximum Flood
- 2. Operations Needs Assessment to Support Development of Alternative Reservoir Outflow Enhancements
- 3. Flood Control Outlet (FCO) Enhanced Reliability
- 4. Alternatives Evaluation for Low-level Outlet
- 5. Oroville Dam Embankment Reliability and Improvements
- 6. Instrumentation and Monitoring for the Oroville Dam Complex
- Integration team



Project Development

- Started as six relatively independent technical tasks.
- Originally envisioned with many task-level workshops and deliverables.
- CNA project leadership and IRB recognized need for project-level integration.
- Several key activities moved from task level to project level.
- HR 5895-Federal Legislation Requiring Level 2 Risk Analysis.
- Adjustments made to the workplan schedule to optimize use of planning study approach.



Project Integration Tasks


- Developing CNA's guiding principles.
- Developing CNA project-level management plan.
- Developing and tracking comprehensive CNA schedule.
- Tracking Independent Review Board's recommendations and CNA's responsive actions.
- Determining current and future without-project conditions.
- Identifying what's working well.
- Applying value analysis to the CNA.
- Developing and enforcing CNA quality management plan.
- Developing strategy for adapting to climate change.
- Outlining final report, including glossary.



CNA Infrastructure Planning Study?

- 1. Identify objectives, constraints, opportunities and needs.
- 2. Identify measures to address those needs.
- 3. Combine measures to formulate alternative plans.
- 4. Evaluate alternative plans with agreed-upon metrics.
- 5. Compare and rank alternative plans.
- 6. Recommend alternative plans for consideration.

CNA Project Approach Diagram






CNA Measures

- A feature or activity that can be implemented to address one or more dam safety issues or opportunities.
- Examples:
 - Modified or new spillway structures.
 - New higher-capacity low-level outlet.
 - Addition of piezometers to embankment.



How are Measures Identified and Screened?

- Measures identified by task teams.
- Measures screened at task level to eliminate inferior proposed measures.
- Best measures carried forward from tasks to project level for integration into plans.






CNA Alternative Plans

- Integrated set of measures that meets objectives at some level, satisfies constraints.
- May include <u>no</u> measures from some tasks and <u>multiple</u> measures from others.
- Formulated by project team, with collaboration and cooperation of task managers and staff.



How are Measures Combined to Create Alternative Plans?





Outcome and Deliverables

- A portfolio of alternative plans, each of which meets goal of CNA.
- An assessment of effectiveness of each alternative plan, using a broad set of evaluation criteria.
- Identification of alternative plans that perform best in different "themes."
- Recommendations for plans or measures that can be implemented early to restore and enhance safety and reliability.



Evaluation Criteria Framework

The CNA team needs to:

- 1. Estimate risk reduction attributable to alternative plans.
- 2. Use practicable approach for risk analysis (semi-quantitative).
- 3. Use criteria consistent with DWR O&M Asset Management Risk Management Framework criteria.
- 4. Consider other benefits gained or consequences avoided.



Draft Evaluation Criteria

	Item no.	Criterion					
	1	Protects public and worker safety					
1	2	Complies with dam safety regulations					
	3	Improves operational flexibility (water delivery / other SWP purposes)					
5	4	Improves operational reliability (water delivery / other SWP purposes)					
Y	5	Follows conventional design approaches					
1	6	Follows conventional construction approaches					
3	7	Requires conventional O&M activities					
	8	Navigates permitting issues successfully					
	9	Assures water and power delivery					
2	10	Implements plan in a timely manner					
	11	Minimizes total cost (e.g., construction, O&M, failure to perform, opportunity cost)					
	12	Achieves robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, rapidity, resiliency					
005	13	Provides other public benefits					




How Will Risk Analyses be Conducted?

		1 Insignificant	2 Minor	3 Moderate	4 High	5 Major	6 Extreme	7 Catastrophi
		Consequence					- 232	
ikely to occur within 100,000 years	1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ikely to occur within 0,000 years	2	2	A	6	8	10	12	14
Likely to occur within 1000 years	3	3	6	9	12	15	18	В
Likely to occur within 100 years	4	4	8	12	16	20	24	
Likely to occur within 30 years	4.5	4.5	9	13.5	18	22.5	26	31.5
Likely to occur within 10 years	5	5	10	15	20	25	30	35
ikely to occur within 3 years	5.5	5.5	11	16.5	22	27.5	35	38.5
Likely to occur within 1 year	6	6	12	18	24	30	36	42
likely to occur 10 times a year	7	7	14	21	28	35	42	49
ikelihood				1				



How are Alternative Plans Compared (Step 5)?

- 1. Compare without-plan and withplan performance over 50-year lifespan for each criterion to identify improvement.
- 2. Use multi-criteria decision-making technique(s) to provide decision makers with information about advantages and disadvantages of each plan.
- 3. Identify obvious beneficial improvements for early implementation.





What is the Outcome of Step 6?

- Recommendation of highest ranking Alternative Plans.
- Identification of early implementation measures or projects.




Outlet Portols -

New Workplan

DRAFT - COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS ASSESSMENT WORKPLAN - September 2018



Questions?



STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES

OROVILLE DAM SAFETY
COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS ASSESSMENT

CNA Task 2 and other Flood Operations Activities

Ad Hoc Meeting

October 30, 2018



Overview

• 2018-19 Winter Operations Plan

• CNA – Task 2

 USACE Water (Flood) Control Manual (WCM) Update




2018-19 Winter Operations Plan

- Maintain flood control standards given the construction status of Main Spillway and Emergency Spillway
- Main Spillway becomes operational December 1, 2018
 - Moderate elevation gains with storage triggers mid-Oct to Dec
- Emergency Spillway enhancements not complete until spring
 - Manage Standard Project Flood (SPF):
 - Without use of the Emergency Spillway
 - While maintaining WCM downstream flow requirements
 - Achieve this objective by:
 - Enhancing existing flood pool during winter months




Elevation Triggers Prior To Main Spillway Recommissioning






Existing WCM Flood Pool





Enhanced Flood Pool (DRAFT)



The informal interim flood operations plan enhances the dry watershed flood pool by 37 TAF and the wet watershed flood pool by 170 TAF.



CNA - Task 2


- Compare CNA alternatives to operations without infrastructural improvements (baseline operations)
- Inform CNA alternative rankings based on operational metrics
- Incorporate any CNA adopted infrastructural changes into USACE Water Control Manual update process

Outline Doutnite -




USACE WCM Update

- Multi-year activity beyond CNA
- Use adopted CNA alternatives to inform formal WCM update
- Anticipate the following as part of the USACE process:
 - Updated hydrologic record
 - Climate change effects
 - Forecast-informed operations
 - Re-assessment of downstream requirements
 - Coordination with partner agencies









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DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES

OROVILLE DAM SAFETY COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Task 3 Flood Control Outlet Enhanced Reliability

Oroville Dam Safety Ad Hoc Committee Meeting No. 2

October 30, 2018



What is Task 3?



- An overall assessment of the Flood Control Outlet that focuses on achieving longterm reliability of the facility.
- Includes operating systems and the FCO's major structural components:
 - New Spillway Chute
 - Gate Structure
 - Adjacent Monoliths
 - Radial Gates



CNA Fundamental Steps

	Step Number	Description of Step
Task 3	1	Identify objectives, constraints, opportunities, and needs.
	2	Identify measures to address those needs.
	3	Combine measures to formulate alternative plans.
Who a	4	Evaluate alternative plans with agreed-upon metrics.
	5	Compare alternative plans.
Marie Control	6	Recommend plans for consideration.

Outlet Portols -

Switt November -

Objective of Task 3


Enhance the long-term reliability of the Flood Control Outlet.

Constraints

- The FCO is an existing structure:
 - Measures must be carefully screened and evaluated to avoid introducing additional or unintended risk.
 - Measures must be implemented in the context of flood control and water supply needs.
- The FCO has 50+ years of service.
 - Measures should consider what has worked well over that time period.
 - How can we better monitor the condition and performance of its various components over time?



Opportunity for Data Collection



electric pump -


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- FCO drain inspection
- Load-Testing of Existing Anchors just Downstream of FCO
- Sampling and Testing of FCO Concrete and Steel





Identify Needs through:



On-going Analyses

- Surveys of Oroville Field Division engineers, mechanics, electricians, and operators.
- Inspections
- Documentation Review and Improvement
 - O&M Manuals and Practices
 - Operation Orders & Instructions
- Level 2 Risk Analysis

Leverage Recent Analyses and Inspections



- 2011 Structural Re-Evaluation of Radial Gates
- 2012 Rope Access Structural Inspection
- 2014 Structural Re-Evaluation of Radial Gates
- 2017 Multiple Rope Access Structural Inspections (during zero flow periods)
- 2017 Radial Gate Maintenance
- 2017 2018 Structural Analyses
- Recent Faulting and Seismicity Studies
- Annual Gate Exercises
- Periodic Balance Checks of Hoist Ropes



Operating Systems and Procedures




- Identify and document redundancy and resiliency of power sources
- Identify critical operational equipment and their condition, availability of replacement parts, etc.
- Review and assess operational procedures for gate operations.
- Assess stop log needs and operations.



How Will This be Used in CNA?

- Measures identified for the FCO will be integrated with those of other tasks
- Identify periodic condition assessment and inspection requirements
- The FCO provides for robust flood control releases. We anticipate many FCO measures to be components of the proposed integrated plans.
- Task 3 could identify smaller measures that would be readily implementable.





STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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OROVILLE DAM SAFETY
COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Task 5 Status Update

Oroville Dam Safety Ad Hoc Committee Meeting No. 2

October 30, 2018





Task 5: Oroville Dam Embankment Reliability and Improvements

Background

Embankment reliability studies had already been initiated in response to the 2014/2015

"Ninth FERC Five-Year Part 12D Report"





2014/2015 Part 12D Recommendations

R-10


"The Board reiterates that the monitoring and analysis of seepage (including turbidity) are vital aspects of understanding the behavior of the dam, particularly because very limited piezometric data are being recorded in the dam..."

Sub-bullets R-10a through R-10h provide further detail.

R-18

"The Board recommends that the issue of potential instability associated with the green spot on the downstream face of the dam toward the left abutment between El 600 and El 700, approximately, be investigated...The investigation..., should include computational analyses to asses the effects of such a zone on the static and seismic stability of the dam..."







Task 5: Oroville Dam Embankment Reliability and Improvements

For Task 5:

Ongoing FERC Part 12D seepage and stability studies, <u>and</u> upcoming FERC Part 12D PFMA/Level 2 RA, *will provide important information for identifying existing conditions, baseline risks, and improvement needs for Task 5.*







CNA Fundamental Steps

E	Step Number	Description of Step
	1	Identify objectives, constraints, opportunities, and needs
	2	Identify measures to address those needs
	3	Combine measures to formulate alternative plans
	4	Evaluate alternative plans with agreed-upon metrics
	5	Compare alternative plans
	6	Recommend plans for consideration

Outlet Portols -

A Water Resources Planning Approach



Task 5 Step 1 - Current Status

Identify objectives, constraints, opportunities, and needs

Outlet Portals -

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Step 1: Identify Problems and Objectives

Previous FERC Part 12D

- R-10 Embankment and foundation seepage (potential for internal erosion and piping).
- R-18 Embankment stability
 - Local stability at "Vegetation Area"
 - Overall stability under normal, flood and seismic loading conditions.

Upcoming FERC Part 12D PFMA/Level 2 RA

Identify Additional Problems/Issues/Potential Risk Reduction



Most Notable Historical PFMs

- Zone 1 Core material piping through broken instrumentation tubes, leading to dam failure.
- Failure of Palermo Tunnel Outlet, leading to erosion of left downstream groin and failure of dam.
- Internal erosion of Zone 1 Core due to filter incompatibility with Zone 2 Transition.
- Embankment erosion under flood loading along FCO Monolith 31.
- Potential instability associated with "Vegetated Area."



Step 1 – Identify Constraints

Examples of Constraints

- Existing as-constructed structure
- Embankment zone engineering properties
- Embankment seepage/phreatic surface
- Limited number of piezometers
- ✓ Seismic and flood loadings
- Aging analytical evaluations



Existing Conditions, Issues and Uncertainties


- Variability/uncertainty of material properties in dam materials.
- Filter compatibility between the core and filter materials.
- "Vegetation Area" on dam face.
- Toe seepage measurements obscured by rain infiltration.
- Broken piezometer tubing for piezometers in core and other embankment zones.
- Need for more sophisticated seepage modeling.
- Need for more sophisticated stability modeling.
- Potential issues at Embankment Dam/FCO Monolith 31 Interface.


Progress of Select Sub-Tasks

Number	Subtask Description	Status
2	Collect, summarize, and review geotechnical design, construction, and performance data of the embankment materials and foundation	100% Complete
3	Review filter compatibility between dam materials and assess the potential for internal erosion	99% Complete
4	Review case histories of internal erosion for dams relevant to Oroville Dam	100% Complete
5	Complete an analysis of rainfall impacts on historical seepage data	95% Complete
8	Perform seepage analyses through/beneath Oroville Dam	50% Complete
11 & 12	In relation to the "Vegetated Area," develop material property statistics, and identify area limits of seasonal changes	98% Complete
13	Perform 2D and 3D slope stability analyses to evaluate potential sliding surfaces within the "Vegetated Area"	Ongoing
15	Review seepage and stability reliability of Parish Camp and Bidwell Bar Canyon Saddle Dams	Recently Started
16	Review seepage and stability reliability of the right abutment portion of the dam embankment that wraps around FCO Monolith 31	Recently Started




Material Properties: Filtered and Plotted vs. Time and Space







Variability of material properties in dam materials



- Developed material properties database.
- Data includes:
 - Gradations
 - Specific gravities
 - Field densities
 - Maximum densities
 - Atterberg limits
 - Hydraulic conductivities
- Metadata includes:
 - Elevation, Stationing, and offset

Example Plot: Percent passing No. 4 sieve for Zone 3 (entire dam – points separated for Left and Right Sides




Seepage and Stability Modeling

- These sub-tasks are still in their early stages.
- Initial modeling and performance measurements have not identified any unexpected issues – consistent with design expectations of performance
- More results will be available in subsequent meetings.




Steady State Seepage 2D Model: Initial Results, Total Head Contours and Flow Paths Maximum Section – Reservoir Elevation 900 feet






Steady State Seepage 2D Model: Initial Results, Total Head Contours and Flow Paths Maximum Section – Reservoir Elevation 900 feet






Steady State Seepage 3D Model











Next Steps

- ✓ Complete FERC Part 12D Seepage/Stability Subtasks
- ✓ Use results of studies to inform upcoming FERC Part 12D PFMA/Level 2 Risk Analyses
- ✓ Use as part of basis for identifying potential improvement *Measures* to address opportunities and needs

Outlot Doutols -

